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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1544 
___________ 
 
JOHN DUNN III, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; MICHAEL 
KLOPOTOSKI; JEROME WALSH; ULLI KLEMM; NORMAN DEMMING;  
DORINA VARNER; ROBIN LUCAS; JAMES PALL; ALL MEMBERS OF THE 
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS COMMITTEE; NANCY FEDOR; D.O.C. 
STAFFS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 09-02542) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edwin M. Kosik 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 19, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed July 30, 2012) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 John Dunn III, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment for prison and 
correctional employees in his civil rights action.  For the following reasons, we will 
summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In December 2009, Dunn filed an in forma pauperis complaint, which he later 
supplemented, alleging that current and former employees of the State Correctional 
Institution at Dallas and the Department of Corrections violated the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc5, 
and the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, by denying him religious 
accommodations while he was confined in the prison.  Specifically, Dunn alleges that he 
was denied access to certain religious objects – including plants, herbs, crystals, tarot 
cards, runes, spices, and an altar cloth – in his cell; that he was not permitted to grow his 
hair or beard; and that he was denied a religious advisor and instead directed to practice 
his Wiccan faith in the privacy of his cell.  He sought damages, fees, and costs, as well as 
injunctive and declaratory relief.  The United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Dunn filed a 
timely pro se appeal.   
 We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  A 
grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that “there is no 
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genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “We review the facts in the light most favorable 
to the party against whom summary judgment was entered.”  Coolspring Stone Supply, 
Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 We first address Dunn’s contention that he has been denied the right to exercise 
his religion freely, as guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  
Prison inmates do not forfeit their constitutional right to freely exercise their religion 
when they enter the prison gates.  See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).  
Incarcerated inmates, however, enjoy their rights under a more limited framework than 
the average citizen.  See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).  Indeed, 
the fact of incarceration and the valid penological objectives of deterrence of crime, 
rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security may justify limitations on the 
exercise of constitutional rights by an inmate.  See DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50-51 
(3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).  A prison regulation that impinges on an inmate’s right to free 
exercise of religion is valid “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”  
O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).   
 To determine the reasonableness of a prison regulation, we consider four factors, 
namely:  (1) whether the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the right remain open to the 
prisoners; (3) what impact accommodation of the asserted right will have on prison 
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guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) the availability of  
“obvious, easy alternatives” to the challenged regulation.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91. 
 The District Court considered these factors and properly concluded that the prison 
authorities’ restrictions were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 
As to the claim that Dunn was denied possession of certain items, the District Court 
found that prison officials had a legitimate interest in maintaining order, security, and 
discipline within the prison.
 
 For example, the defendants submitted that they denied 
Dunn’s request for runes and tarot cards because those items could be used by inmates to 
manipulate others, posing a security concern.  See, e.g., Mayfield v.Tex. Dep’t of 
Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 610-11 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that runestones and tarot 
cards could be used for “gambling, trafficking, and trading” and thus “pose a unique 
security risk”). Similarly, defendants relied on statements that the grooming policy 
detailed in Administrative Directive 807 helps limit hiding places for contraband and is 
important for inmate identification purposes for the staff.  See Cole v. Flick, 758 F.2d 
124, 131 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1985) (relying on identical factors to conclude that hair length 
directive is not an invalid infringement on First Amendment rights).   
 The District Court found that even with the restrictions, Dunn’s right to practice 
religion was not substantially or significantly burdened and that he had various means of 
religious expression available to him, including the ability to pray and conduct religious 
rituals in his cell, as Dunn himself admitted in his deposition.  The Court also found that 
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Dunn retained some means of individual religious expression, including possession of 
certain religious objects and books and the ability to correspond and visit with an outside 
spiritual advisor, a Wiccan priestess.  For the reasons stated by the District Court, we 
agree that summary judgment on the free exercise claims was warranted. 
 The District Court also did not err in granting summary judgment to the 
defendants on Dunn’s RLUIPA claims.  RLUIPA prohibits the government from 
imposing “a substantial burden” on a prisoner’s religious exercise, even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government shows that the burden 
is in furtherance of a “compelling governmental interest” and is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that interest.  See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)).  A “substantial burden” exists where (1) a 
follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting 
benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the 
precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; or (2) the government puts 
substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his 
beliefs.  Id. at 280. 
 As we have just noted, on summary judgment, the defendants identified 
significant, legitimate penological interests underlying their policies, including the 
restriction on Dunn’s hair length.  Moreover, Dunn failed to point to evidence sufficient 
to establish the threshold element of this claim, namely, a “substantial burden” on the 
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exercise of his religion as a result of enforcement of the regulation.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
2000cc-1(a).  Dunn contends that “[h]air is considered to be the natural receptacle of the 
vital essence . . . of the body,” but he does not explain how failure to maintain long hair 
affects his particular religious beliefs.  See Washington, 497 F.3d at 277-78 (noting that 
in religious discrimination claims pursuant to RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
persuasion on whether the challenged practice substantially burdens the plaintiff’s 
practice of religion).  He has thus failed to establish a substantial burden on religious 
exercise.   
 Dunn also alleged that the defendants violated his rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause, but he failed to provide any competent summary judgment evidence 
that similarly situated faiths are treated differently.  See Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n.2 (“We 
do not suggest, of course, that every religious sect or group within a prison - however few 
in number - must have identical facilities or personnel.”).  Accordingly, we agree that 
summary judgment on the equal protection claim was warranted.  See Williams v. 
Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 Finally, for the reasons given by the District Court, Dunn’s complaint did not state 
an Eighth Amendment claim sufficient to withstand summary judgment.  See Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  Nor, we note, did Dunn provide any evidence to 
support such a claim.  
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 Because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
